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REMEDYING SEGREGATED PUBLIC HOUSING IN
METROPOLITAN BALJ'IMORE
As a result of the actions and inactions of local government
in the Baltimore metropolitan area, low-income public housing occupied by black families has been effectively confined
to low-income black neighborhoods in Baltimore City,
fostering a pattern of racial and economic segregation ·in
the metropolitan area. The author examines the establishment of this cycle and considers the judicial and local and
federal legislative means available to break it.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areal underwent significant demographic change during the last two decades.
Typical of large metropolitan areas, there :was a substantial exodus
of white families from the city to the suburban areas 2 which

The statistical data used in this article reflects conditions for the year 1970 unless
specified otherwise.
1. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) is a term defined by the Office
of Management and Budget and used extensively by the Bureau of Census.
Generally, a SMSA consists of a central city having a population exceeding
50,000 persons and the contiguous counties if socially and economically integrated with the central city. The Baltimore SMSA consists of Baltimore City
and Carroll, Harford, Howard, Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties. See
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAs (1967).
2. During the decade between 1960 and 1970, the city experienced an absolute population loss of over 30,000 persons with a net outmigration of nearly 120,000
persons. This net outmigration was comprised of an absolute outmigration by
whites of 150,000 persons and an absolute inmigration by nonwhites of 30,000
persons. The suburban counties, however, experienced a population growth of
300,000 persons, 60 percent of which was the result of net inmigration. The white
migration from the city to the suburbs accounted for a white-nonwhite proportional change during the ten year period. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS
OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, General Demographic Trends for Metropolitan
Areas, 1960 to 1970, Maryland, PHC(2)-22, 5 (1971). More recent population
estimates and projections indicate that the suburban counties will continue to
grow during the next decade at the expense of the city. See DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, MARYLAND POPULATION ESTIMATES 1974 AND
PROJECTIONS TO 1980, at 11 (1975). See generally K. TAEuBER & A. 'TAEUBER,
NEGROES IN CITIES (1965); DAVIS & DONALDSON, BLACKS IN THE UNITED
STATES: A GEOGRAPHIC PROSPECTIVE (1975).
As to the United States, the black population of the nation's central cities
has increased by 3.2 million while the white population has declined by 600,000
between 1960 and 1970. Blacks increased only in metropolitan areas while black
populations in nonmetropolitan areas declined by more than one quarter of a
million persons. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND
HOUSING, General Demographic Trends for Metropolitan Areas, 1960 to 1970,
United States Summary, PHC(2)-l, 4 (1971).
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resulted in the city's population becoming disproportionately black3
and disproportionately poor.' In contrast, the suburban counties
attracted white, economically advantaged families. 1I If this trend
were to continue unabated, the city's population would be overwhelmingly black by the year 2000. 6 As whites continue to flee the
city, the concentration of low-income families will intensify.'T A
heavier burden is then placed on the city to provide costly services
despite an erosion of its tax base as a result of the exodus of
higher-income families. 8
3. The entire Baltimore SMSA has a 23.7 percent black population. It is not evenly
distributed. The city's population is over 46 percent black, while the remainder
of the SMSA is less than 6 percent black. The percentage black population for
each locality in the SMSA is set forth below:
Harford County____
8.2%
Anne Arundel County_ 11.1%
3.2%
Howard County___
8.1%
Baltimore County____
Carroll COunty_____
4.0%
Baltimore City______ 46.4%
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, Census
Tracts, Baltimore, Md., Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, PHC(I)-19,
Table P-l (1972).
4. There is a disparity of median incomes between the families living in the city
and those living in the suburban counties. See the table below for the median
income levels for Baltimore City and each county in the SMSA.
Anne Arundel County _
11,474
Harford County____ 10,750
Baltimore County____ 12,072
Howard County_____ 13,461
Carroll County_______ 10,180
Baltimore City____
8,814
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, Per Capita, Median
Family Money Income, and Low Income Status in 1969 for States, Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, and Counties 1970, PC(SI)-63, Table 3 (1974).
Baltimore City also houses a greater percentage of below poverty level families:
5.7%
Harford County____
6.2%
Anne Arundel County_
3.5%
Howard County___
4.2%
Baltimore COunty__
Carroll COunty____
6.6%
Baltimore City_____ 14.0%

Id.
5. See notes 2-4 supra. But see League of Women Voters of Baltimore County,
Everybody's Got to be Someplace, I-I (Sept. 1975) [hereinafter cited as League].
In America, poor people have the same right as the rich to live in a slum.
When it comes to living in the greener pastures of suburbia, however, it's
a different story. The rich can afford to pay the price of admission there;
the poor cannot. So the affiuent move to suburbia .•.• The poor stay where
they "belong", in the inner city.
L. RUBINOWITZ, Low-INCOME HOUSING: SUBURBAN STRATEGmS 1 (1974).
6. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RrGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA 4
(1974) [hereinafter cited as the FLEMMING CoMM'N REPORT]. See also NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc.
No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1968) [hereinafter cited as the DOUGLASS
COMM'N REPORT].
7. DOUGLASS COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 6, at 5.
.8. FLEMMING CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-11.
Baltimore City Council fiscal advisor Janet Hoffman believes a most serious problem is the parasitic financial relationship which exists between
the city and the suburbs. Testifying at an August 1970 Commission hearing in Baltimore, Ms. Hoffman described the drain which commuters cause
on city resources. Baltimore is not able to tax suburbanites who work in
the city, yet it supports many services used by suburban dwellers. Ms.
Hoffman cited the hospitals, stadium, zoo, art museums, and many taxexempt organizations - health, cultural, charitable, and religious - as
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The low-income city dweller's outlook appears bleak. As industry and blue collar employment opportunities continue to move
to the suburbs, 9 he is left behind, facing significantly higher odds
of being unemployed. 10
An investigation of the causes of residential segregation discloses a variety of contributing factors,ll dominated by racial disexamples of activities which the city alone subsidizes, but which people
from the regional area use extensively. There is no parallel benefit from
the suburbs to the urban dweller.
/d. at 11. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 760 n.12 (1974) ; Gautreaux
v. Romney, 457 F2d 124, 138 (7th Cir. 1972).
9. FLEMMING CoMM'N REPoRT, supra note 6, at 11. "[B]etween 1955 and 1965, 82
industries relocated from Baltimore City to the surrounding suburbs, most of
them in Baltimore County." !d. See also Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), ajJ'd on other grounds sub nom. Hills v.
Gautreaux,96 S.Ct. 1538 (1976). Between 1948 and 1968 jobs increased in Baltimore City by 11 percent, but increased in the surrounding counties by 245 percent.
Hearings Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Baltimore, Maryland, 14
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Baltimore Hearings].
10. The unemployment figures set forth in the table below reveal that blacks faced
higher unemployment in most areas of the SMSA. Additionally, the table illustrates the unemployment problems faced by city residents.
MALES
(Negroes)
Percent
Percent
Unemployed
Unemployed
Anne Arundel County________ _
2.8%
2.2%
Baltimore County
2.9%
2.1%
Carroll County__________
5.7%
1.8%
Harford COunty__________
2.1%
3.4%
Howard COunty__________
2.0%
1.7%
Baltimore City___________"'"
5.8%
4.3%
FEMALES
(Negroes)
Percent
Percent
Unemployed
Unemployed
Anne Arundel County
3.5%
52%
Baltimore County________
3.4%
3.0%
Carroll County
"32%
1.3%
5.5%
9.5%
Harford County
Howard County
2.3%
4.4%
5.1%
6.7%
Baltimore City
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1970' CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, Census
Tracts, Baltimore, Md., Standard" Metropolitan Statistical Area, PHC(l)-19,
Tables P-3, P-6 (1972). Cf. Baltimore Hearings; sUpra note 9, at 506, Exhibit
No. 5 (Staff Report, Demographic Economics, Social and Political Characteristics of Baltimore City and Baltimore County y.
11. See, e.g., Taeuber, Demographic Perspectives on Housing and School Segregation,21 WAYNE L. REv. 833, 83~1 (1975). In this article Professor Taeuber
briefly analyzes the three major types of causes of" residential segregation recognized by scholars: (1) economics, or the poverty "of blacks; (2) choice, or the
" self-separation of blacks; and (3) racial discri~ruttion. ld. at 836. The argument supporting economics as a factor is based on the paucity of low and moderate income housing in the suburbs concomitant with the propensity of blacks to
be poor. Professor Taeuber poin~s out, however, that the validity of this argument has not been substantiated by complex statistical analysis. "ld. at 837. He
also relegates the "choice" factor to a position' of dhninutive influence. I d. at
838--39. He concludes that the prime cause of residential segregation is racial
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crimination. 12 Racial discrimination taints both the public and
private housing markets. 13 When the local Public Housing Agency
(PHA) selects and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) approves a public housing site located in the
inner city, the pattern of residential segregation is reinforced.
Conversely, selection of sites in racially mixed areas reverses this
pattern.14
This article focuses on the role of public housing11i in creating
the existing pattern of segregated housing in the Baltimore metropolitan area, and explores the affirmative methods available to
reverse this pattern.

12.

13.

14.
15.

discrimination. ld. at 840. See also O. DAVIS & G. DONALDSON, BLACKS IN THE
UNITED STATES: A GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE ch. 6 (1975); K. TAEUBER & A.
TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES (1965); Campbell & Schuman, Racial Attitudes
in 15 American Cities, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (F. Praeger pub. 1968).
Taeuber, Demographic Perspectives an Housing and School Segregation, 21
WAYNE L. REv. 833, 840 (1975). See generally J. KAIN & 1. QUIGLEY, HOUSING
MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1975), in which the authors conclude that
"only a small portion of residential segregation can be attributed to socio-economic
differences between black and white households." ld. at 90. Not only do they
reject economics as a primary cause of residential segregation, but they intimate
that racial discrimination in the housing market, which has inhibited black home
ownership, is a contributing factor to black economic deprivation. ld. at 90-91.
As does Professor Taeuber, they conclude that the major cause of residential
segregation is racial discrimination. ld.
Taeuber, Demographic Perspectives an Housing and School SegregatiOl~, 21
WAYNE L. REv. 833, 840 (1975). See also Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterl~ of the
Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483 (1973). This article reports the findings of a quantitative
analysis measuring the correlation of various factors with what the authors term
"income group clustering." It reveals a significant correlation in Baltimore
between race and income group clustering. ld. at 507-08 (Table II, variable
X5). The 1970 Census appears to support the proposition that race rather than
economics is the primary factor in the creation of concentrations of low-income
persons in Baltimore City. The analysis was stated as follows:
Although a high proportion of the poor reside in the low-income areas,
blacks who were above the poverty level were more likely to live in the
area than whites who were below this level.
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS,. 1970 CE."fSUS OF POPULAnoN, Low-Income Neighborhoods in Large Cities: 1970, Baltimore, Md., PC(SI)-66, ii (1974). For a
discussion of racial discrimination in the private housing market, see Comment,
Racial Discrimination in the Private Housil'1l Sector: Five Years After, 33 MD.
L. REv. 289 (1973).
Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Maxwell, HUD's
Project Selection Criteria - A Cure for "Impermissible Color Blindness"',
48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 92 (1972).
Public housing as used herein refers to federal housing programs which are
derived from the United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888
(1937), as amended. The programs are generally labeled by their corresponding section of the 1937 Act. For example, the housing assistance program corresponds with Section 8 of the 1937 Act. See DOUGLASS COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 6, ch. 3. See also Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 642 (1966). The public housing programs for the elderly and
handicapped are not discussed in this article.
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PUBLIC HOUSING AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

The lower-income black tenants of public housing in Baltimore
City are victimized by a form of two-tiered racial discrimination.
First, the suburban areas surrounding the city, especially Baltimore
County, effectively exclude lower-income blacks.16 Second, the only
housing affordable by the poor - public housing in the city subjects blacks to discrimination in site selection and tenant assignment.H

A. Exclusion from the Suburbs
A variety of factors has resulted in the exclusion of blacks and
the poor from metropolitan suburban areas. IS These factors include zoning and subdivision regulations, housing and building
codes, private restrictive covenants and the personal prejudice of
suburban residents. 19
By policies of action and inaction, Baltimore County has effectuated the exclusion of low-income blacks from its housing market. 20
Baltimore County has employed all of the traditional land use controls such as zoning, building codes, building permit regulations
and subdivision regulations that result in housing that is beyond
the means of low-income individuals.21 For example, county zoning
laws have not only been employed as a shield to exclude lowerincome blacks, but also as a sword to uproot and eliminate black
suburban enclaves.22
16. See, e.g., Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 701, (Exhibit No. 15, Rabin. The
Effect of Development Control on Housing Opportunities for Black Households
in Baltimore County, Maryland). See generally FLEMMING COMM'N REPoRT,
supra note 6, at 29-32. See also note 25 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 37-50 infra.
18. See Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use
Control and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483, 484-85 (1973).
See also O. DAVIS & G. DONALDSON, BLACKS IN THE UNITED STATES: A GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE 140, 145 (1975).
19. See Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use
Control and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483, 484-85
(1973).
20. Cf. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 486 (closing statement of Chairman
Hesburgh).
21. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 681 (Staff Report, Land Use Control in
Relation to Racial and Economic Integration). These land use controls, resulting from county council ;I.ction, "have created a maj or obstacle to racial and
economic integration in Baltimore County." Id. at 275 (testimony of David
Hunter, Staff Attorney, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights).
22. FLEMMING CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 30-31. An urban planning consultant
testified to two specific examples of the use of zoning controls to displace blacks.
First, in an area of Dundalk known as Turner Station, a black neighborhood of
approximately 600 homes was rezoned industrial and the homes destroyed. A
pocket of white residences in the middle of this area retained its residential
zoning. Second, a black residential area of Towson known as Sandy Bottom no
longer exists because a threat of commercial zoning caused the landlords to sell
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Unlike the other suburban counties, Baltimore County has not
created a Public Housing Agency. Until recently, the county was
devoid of public housing programs23 despite the assertion by public
interest groups of a prodigious need for such programs. 24 Balti-·
more County has rejected the city's offers to assist in the organization of a housing program in the county.25 County officials haverepeatedly asserted their confidence in the private market's ability
to supply lower-income housing as justification for their failure to.
instigate public housing programs.26 Although the private housingmarket in the county flourished,27 many lower-income residents
were forced to migrate to the city to secure affordable housing. 2s
Other actions by Baltimore County have contributed to the continuing unavailability of lower-income housing in the county. For
example, in 1968, Baltimore County applied to HUD for a grant to
finance the writing of a water and sewer master plan pursuant to
federal legislation which funds such activity.29 Upon learning that
the applicable section of the law had been amended to require a
program pertaining to lower-income and minority housing needs,
the county promptly withdrew its application.30 After hearing
testimony relating to the above policies and events, Chairman
Hesburgh of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights remarked:
In a variety of contexts we heard testimony during these
three days that white residents of Baltimore County want

23.

24.

25.
26.

27.

28.

29.
30.

homes occupied by black tenants. Accord, Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at
279-80 (testimony of Yale Rabin, Planning Consultant, U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).
A real estate firm has been subcontracted by the State of Maryland to administer
a Section 8 housing assistance program in Baltimore County. It has been allocated funds to finance between 410 and 710 units. League, note 5 supra, at III-7.
For an explanation of Section 8 housing, see text accompanying notes 140-44
infra.
Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 742. The League of Women Voters of
Baltimore County, Baltimore County Community Action Agency, and Baltimore
Neighborhoods, Inc., among other groups, have stressed the need for lower-income
housing in Baltimore County. See generally League, supra note 5.
See Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 76-78 (testimony of Robert C. Embry,
Commissioner, Department of Housing and Community Development).
!d. at 393 (testimony of Dale Anderson, Baltimore County Executive).
Between 1960 and 1968, the number of housing units in Baltimore City increased
by only 2,345 units. During the same period of time, there was an increase in
Baltimore County of 40,551 housing units. ld. at 513.
ld. at 517 citing League of Women Voters of Baltimore County, Report of the
Housing Workshop 12 (1968). Many of the lower-income county residents who
were forced to migrate to the city eventually were housed in the city's public
housing projects. ld. Due to insufficient public housing to satisfy the needs of
city residents, HCD offered assistance to the county to organize a public housing
program in an attempt to deter the influx of lower-income persons into the city.
The county was unresponsive. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
Housing Act of 1954 § 701, 40 U.S.c. § 461 (1970).
Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 736 (Staff Report, HUD Programs and
Activity in Baltimore City and County).
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to keep their county the way it is. It is as though they have
built an island fortress where strangers, and in this context it's impossible not to read the word "strangers" to
mean poor and blacks, where they are not welcome.81
Judicial challenge to exclusion of low-income residents from
suburban areas is difficult at best, primarily because the exclusion
occurs through laws and pOlicies which are ostensibly neutral.S2
The laws seem neutral due to their stated goals of protection of
health, reduction of pressure on local services, enhancement of the
physical environment and preservation of property values. ss Regardless, the result is the exclusion of low-income residents. s4 This
is not to say that the issue has not been litigated, but the cases do
not provide definitive guidelines for judicial challenge to suburban
segregated housing. 35 On the other hand, judicial challenge to the
31. Id. at 486.

32. See generally Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall:
Land Use Control and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L,J.
483 (1973).
33. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969).
34. Id.
3S. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (city of Rochester taxpayers
lacked standing to assert claim that zoning laws of the suburban town of Penfield
excluded persons of low income); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)
(upholding constitutionality of state requirement of local referendum for lowerincome housing projects); Citizens' Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507
F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) (city's failure to
fund a lower-income project upheld in the absence of a racially discriminatory
intent) ; Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (constitutionality of large-lot zoning ordinance upheld); Mahaley v. Cuyahoga
Metropolitan Housing Authority, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied,
419 U.S. 1108 (1975) (constitutionality of the consent and cooperation agreement
upheld); Cornelius v. City of Parma, 374 F. Supp. 730, rev'd mem., 506 F.2d
1400 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 1052 (1975) (black and
white plaintiffs were unable to challenge city's ordinance excluding low-rent
housing projects unless approved by referendum because context was not a
justiciable controversy); with Metropolitan H.D. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cerl. granted, 95 S. Ct. 560 (1976)
(city's failure to rezone piece of property to permit low and moderate-income
housing development held unconstitutional); United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), ceri. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (city's
ordinance prohibiting multi-family dwelling discriminates against blacks in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1968); United Farmworkers of Fla.
Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974)
(city's failure to extend water and sewage services had racially discriminatory
effect); Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th
Cir. 1972) (two non-profit corporations developing federally assisted housing
had standing to challenge exclusionary effects of city's ordinance); Kennedy
Park Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970),
cerl. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (withholding building permits for a low and
moderate-income housing subdivision held to violate the equal protection clause) ;
Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) (city's zoning decision
blocking the development of a low and moderate-income subdivision held to
violate the fourteenth amendment). See also Board of Supervisors of Fairfax
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type of racial discrimination fostered by the city in site selection
of public housing and tenant assignment has succeeded in recent
years. 36

B.

Discrimination by the City

The first public housing law was passed by Congress in 1937P
and shortly thereafter the Baltimore Housing Authority was created. s8 During the early years of development, public housing
projects were operated on a racially segregative basis in Baltimore. S9 With the passage of time and the concomitant demographic
transformation of the inner city from white to nonwhite, some
projects originally located in predominantly white neighborhoods
now appertain to black neighborhoods. 40 Both the originally segregative basis and the transformation of neighborhoods contributed
to the current concentration of public housing in black neighborhoods.
Urban renewal programs also contributed to the concentration
of public housing in black neighborhoods due to the requirement41
that new units be constructed in the same neighborhood where
deteriorating units were destroyed. 42 Since the urban renewal
areas 43 were predominantly black, reconstruction in black-populated areas resulted. Also, as in other cities, black residents displaced by urban renewal programs were relocated within the same

36.

37.
38.
39.

40.
41.

42.
43.

County v. De Graff Enterprises, Inc., 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973)
(ordinance requiring subdivision builders to allocate specific percentage of units to
low and moderate-income housing held unconstitutional).
Fifty years ago the Supreme Court declared that zoning laws were immune
from constitutional attack unless they failed to relate to the public welfare,
morals, safety, or general welfare. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) ; Banks v. Perk, 341 F.
Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La.
1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.
1969). But see Thompson v. Housing Authority of City of Miami, 251 F.
Supp.121 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937).
BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 13, § 1 (1966).
Housing Authority of Baltimore City, Fourth Report 10 (1945). In this report
by a city agency, housing projects are identified by race. See also E. Ash, The
Baltimore Story 2 (Dec. 9, 1955), where the Director of Management of the
Housing Authority of Baltimore outlines the procedures to be taken to convert
from segregative to integrated housing practices in Baltimore City.
Interview with Robert C. Embry, Commissioner, Department of Housing and
Community Development, in Baltimore, Sept. 23, 1976 [hereinafter cited as
Embry Interview].
Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 105 (c), 63 Stat. 416 (1949), as amended,
42 U.S.c. § 1455(c) (1970).
ld.
See BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 13, §§ 34-51 (1966), for a description of where
the urban renewal areas were located.
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neighborhood. 44 Prior to 1968, the Baltimore City Department of
Housing and Community Development (HCD) made little or no
effort to offer relocation housing in racially mixed or predomina-ntly
white areas to displaced blacks.45
The public housing program in Baltimore City has been and
is racially segregated.46 The sites selected for public housing and
the tenant assignment to individual projects demonstrate the degree of segregation. Of the twenty-two public housing projects
existing in 1970, only four were located in neighborhoods where
the nonwhite population did not exceed sixty percent.47 Three of the
four projects located in white neighborhoods were populated overwhelmingly by white tenants. 48 These three projects were the only
ones with significant white populations.49 Ten of the remaining
eighteen projects were located in neighborhoods where the nonwhite population exceeded ninety-five percent.50 Indeed, a strong
correlation existed and continues to exist between the racial composition of the tenant population and the racial composition of the
neighborhood in which the project is located. 51 Although 1976
data for the racial composition of neighborhoods is unavailable,
the tenant composition statistics continue to reveal a high degree
of segregation. 52 It seems unlikely, however, that the neighborhoods
have changed in any significant manner in the past six years.
At a minimum, a de facto segregative condition exists in the
public housing program in Baltimore. 53 In Banks v. p,erk,54 suit
was brought against the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA), located in Ohio, seeking, inter alia, a declaration
that CMHA's site selection practice was racially discriminatory,
44. Cf. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968).
45. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 79-80 (testimony of Robert C. Embry,
Commissioner, Department of Housing and Community Development).
46. This is not to say that it is being operated on a discriminatory basis. The present
segregation of public housing is due more to the vestiges of past discriminatory
actions.
47. See Appendix A (App. A) and Appendix B (App. B) for a listing of the
projects and the percentages of white and nonwhite population in each project.
App. A lists figures for the year 1970, App. B lists figures for 1976. The census
tract data for the percentage of nonwhite population in all of the neighborhoods
is not available for 1976.
48. See App. A.
49. ld.
50. ld.
51. ld.
52. See App. B.
53. See Apps. A and B. The overwhelmingly one-race character of the projects
evidences segregation, all that is needed for a de facto condition to exist.
[D]e facto segregation is a condition created by factors apart from the
conscious activity of government and de jure segregation [is] caused or
maintained by state action.
Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 39, 49 (2d Cir. 1975).
54. 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973).

146

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 6

and violative of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
In assessing whether the continued maintenance of a segregated
public housing system violated the fourteenth amendment, the
court found that such de facto segregation warranted relief. 55 The
court held that CMHA was charged with an affirmative duty to
integrate the public housing in the city. 56 The factual pattern presented to the court in Banks is very similar to the pattern found in
Baltimore. 57
The Supreme Court, however, still refuses to discard the de
facto - de jure distinction.58 The question arising in any segregation suit is what proof meets the burden of showing de jure
segregation. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Hart
'V. Community School Board of Education :59
A finding of de jure segregation may be based on actions
taken, coupled with omissions made, by governmental authorities which have the natural and foreseeable consequence of causing educational segregation. To say that
the foreseeable must be shown to have been actually foreseen would invite a standard almost impossible of proof
save by admissions. eo
Notwithstanding the indication in Banks that de facto segregation in public housing may be constitutional in magnitude, evidence of ,de jure segregation exists in the Baltimore City public
housing program. As previously mentioned, at its inception the public housing program was operated on a racially segregative basis.lll
Also, the administration of the urban renewal programs aggravated the condition.62 However, the governmental actions evidencing most clearly de jure segregation occurred in 1966, when
the Baltimore City Council passed a resolution confining Section
55. Id. at 1184-85.
56. Id.
57. In both cities, the housing authorities did not impose tenant quotas, site location
was not cleared in advance with the councilman for the district, projects were
erected in white areas and neighborhood shifts caused projects originally built
in white neighborhoods to now be located in black areas. The situation in Banks
and in Baltimore differ from the factual pattern presented the court in the case
of Gautreau~ v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. 111. 1969).
See Section III (A) infra.
58. Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 129 (1973). Despite a vigorous argument by Justice PowelI, the Court refused to abandon the de facto - de jUre
distinction. The Court did adopt a principle by which school authorities found
to be guilty of de jure segregation in one segment of the district had the burden
of showing that de facto segregation existing in another segment was not
caused by their actions.
59. 512 F2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
60. /d. at 50.
61. See note 39 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra.
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23 leased housing programs63 to urban renewal areas. 64 Since
urban renewal areas were mostly black, the resolution served to
restrict this program to black areas, which effectively terminated
the program in Baltimore City altogether. 65
The site selection of public housing also provides evidence of
de jure segregation. Between 1960 and 1970, the Baltimore Housing Authority (BCD's predecessor) proposed twenty-one project
sites to the city council, eighteen of which were in black neighborhoods. 66
Using the Hart tests,67 actions such as the above by governmental authority constitute de jure segregation, having the natural
and foreseeable consequence of causing segregation in public housing in Baltimore.68 It is this type of governmental discrimination,
constitutional in magnitude, which invokes metropolitan relief. 69

63. The Section 23 program was added to the United States Housing Act of 1937
by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, § 103(a), 79 Stat. 451
(1965). Pursuant to this program the PHA leases vacant dwelling units from
private owners and subleases them to low-income families.
64. See BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 13, §§ 34-51 (1966).
65. Embry Interview, supra note 40.
66. Comment, Public Housing and Integration: A Neglected Opportunity, 6 CoLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 253, 261 (1970).
67. Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) involved
school segregation rather than housing discrimination. The standards employed
to determine whether segregation, either de jure or de facto, exists should be
the same, however, since both problems intertwine and fall within the purview
of the fourteenth amendment. Also, in Hills v. Gautreau~, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976),
the Court cited school desegregation cases in its analysis of a housing desegregation problem. Moreover, the Federal District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia has noted:
For better or worse, both by legislative act and judicial decision, this nation
is committed to a policy of balanced and dispersed public housing. Among
other things, this reflects the recognition that in the area of public housing
local authorities can no more confine low-income blacks to a compacted and
concentrated area than they can confine their children to segregated schools.
Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp.382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F2d 788 (5th Cir.
.
1972) (citations omitted).
68. ct. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), where the court concluded:
Possibly before 1964 the administrator of the federal housing programs
could ... remain blind to the very real effect that racial concentration has
had in the development of urban blight. Today such color blindness is
impermissible.
[d. at 820. In Gautreau~ v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D.
Ill. 1969), Judge Austin remarked:
[T]his court ruled that "plaintiffs as present and future users of the system
have the right under the Fourteenth Amendment to have sites selected
without regard to the racial composition of either the surrounding neighborhoods or of the projects themselves." The statistics on the family housing site ... show a very high probability, a near certainty, that many sites
were vetoed on the basis of racial composition of the site neighborhood.
[d. at 913 (citation omitted).
69. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976), discussed infra Section IlIA.
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METROPOLITAN RELIEF

The Supreme Court has declared that "the command of the
Fourteenth Amendment is that no 'State' shan deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."7o A coronary to this principle is that states cannot escape their obligations
under this amendment by delegating state functions to local governments.71 Once it is found that a state or local subdivision
thereof has violated the Constitution, then "the court has not
merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so
far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past,
as well as bar like discrimination in the future."72 In formulating
such a decree, the district courts are to be guided by traditional
principles of equity.73 While the scope of the district court's
equitable powers are broad, prior cases counsel that "judicial
powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional vioIation."74 When state policies foster segregation, equal protection
is denied. 75
Until the Supreme Court announced its decision in Milliken v.
Bradley,76 the law was clear that municipal boundaries could be
crossed when necessary to remedy a constitutional violation. 77 In
Milliken, the district court, after finding that the Detroit Board
of Education had created and perpetuated racial segregation in the
city's schools, appointed a panel to submit a desegregation plan
which would encompass Detroit plus fifty-three suburban school
districts. 78 The suburban school districts were to be incorporated
into the proposed plan despite the absence of proof that they had
committed acts of de jure segregation. 79 The Supreme Court held
their inclusion impermissible:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school
districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate
70. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
71. Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 658 (E.n. La. 1961),
aff'd per curiam, 388 U.S. 515 (1962).
72. Louisiana v. United States, 368 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
The objective today remains to eliminate .•• all vestiges of state-imposed
segregation. • • . That was the basis for the holding in Green that school
authorities are "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971), quoting
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
73. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 12 (1971).
74. [d. at 15-16. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974).
75. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 495 (1954).
76. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
77. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
78. 418 U.S. at 733.
79. [d.
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units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district
remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a
significant segregative effect in another district.so
The Court elaborated further that "without an inter-district violation and inter-district effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling
for an inter-district remedy."sl It was against the backdrop of this
scenario that Hills v. Gautreaux 82 was decided by the Supreme
Court.

A. Hills v. Gautreaux
The Gautreaux case originated in 1966, when black tenants of
and applicants for public housing in the city of Chicago instituted
separate class actions in federal district court against the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA)83 and HUD,S4 charging them with intentionally maintaining an existing pattern of residential segregation through tenant assignment and site selection procedures, in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The district court
stayed the action against HUD pending the outcome of the action
against CHA.85 After finding that CHA had unconstitutionally
discriminated on the basis of race in site selection and tenant
assignment, the court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.86 CHA was ordered to "affirmatively administer its public
housing system .•. to the end of disestablishing the segregated
public housing system which has resulted from CHA's unconstitutional ... procedures ... and use its best efforts to increase the
supply of Dwelling Units as rapidly as possible...."81
The case against CHA then receded into the background as
the district court focused its attention on the action against HUD.
80. ld. at 744-45. In Milliken, the Court noted that an inter-district violation also
warrants an inter-district remedy. !d. at 745, 755.
81. ld. at 745.
Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for inter-district relief, but, the notion that school district
lines may be casually ignored or treated as mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our country.
ld. at 741.
82. 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
83. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
84. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
85. ld. at 753.
86. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. 111. 1969).
87. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736, 741 (N.D. Ill.
1969). Over a year expired without the submission by CRA of proposed new
housing sites. In an unreported decision the district court modified the 1969 order
to require submission by CHA of sites for 1500 new units. The modified order
was appealed and affirmed. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 436 F.2d
306,308-11 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
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The court dismissed all four counts of the suit against HUD.88
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded with directions to enter summary
judgment for the plaintiffs. s9 On remand, the district court granted
summary judgment against HUD, consolidated the cases, and entered an order requiring the parties to propose remedial plans.90
HUD proposed, and the district court accepted, a remedial plan
confined to the municipal boundaries of the city of Chicago.91 The
plaintiffs, whose request for a metropolitan plan order was rejected,92 appealed the court's finding that metropolitan relief was
unwarranted because "the wrongs were committed solely within
the limits of Chicago and solely against residents of the City."93
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case for adoption
of a comprehensive metropolitan area plan.9! The Seventh Circuit
interpreted Milliken to hold that the equitable factors in that case
disfavored a metropolitan plan because of the administrative complexities of school district consolidation and because of the deeply
rooted tradition of local government control of public schools. 95
The court noted that "the equitable factors which prevented metropolitan relief in Milliken v. Bradley are simply not present here."96
Contending that the Milliken decision barred the implementation of any metropolitan area plan, HUD obtained review by the
88. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 1971).
89. ld. at 740. While this case was pending, plaintiffs sought an injunction against
HUD's grant of Model Cities funds to Chicago until CRA had submitted housing sites to the city council for approval. The injunction was granted by the
district court, but overturned on appeal. Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.Zd 124
(7th Cir. 1972).
90. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ill.
1973), rev'd, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1558 (1976).
91. ld.
92. The plaintiff's motion asked the court to consider a metropolitan plan similar to
the one which had been affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in Bradley v. Milliken,
484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), a case dealing with racial segregation in the Detroit
city schools. Ironically, the Bradley plan was reversed by the Supreme Court,
while the Gautreauz plan was affirmed. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974), rev'g 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).
93. 363 F. Supp. at 690-91.
94. 503 F.Zd at 939. For the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in distinguishing Milliken,
see note 96 infra and accompanying text. An excellent outline of the GautrealU"
cases can be found in Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation after
Milliken v. Bradley; The Case for Land Use Litigation Strategies, 24 CATH.
U.L. REv. 633 (1975); see also Note, The Limits of Litigation: Public Housing
Site Selection and the Failure of Injunctive Relief, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1330
(1974); Comment, Of Courts and Coercion: Enjoinillg Federal Funding to
Eliminate Segregation of Public Housing, 58 IOWA L. REv. 1283 (1973);
Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1172 (1969); 83 RARV. L. REv. 1441 (1970);
17 ST. LoUIS U.L.]. 395 (1973).
95. 503 F 2d at 935-36.
96. ld. at 936. The court further observed that there was "no deeply rooted tradition of local control of public housing; rather, public housing is a fairly supervised program with early roots in the federal statute." Id.

1976]

Public Housing

151

Supreme Court. It asserted two reasons why a remedy extending
beyond the boundaries of Chicago should not be granted. First,
the grant of a metropolitan area-wide order would be incommensurate with the constitutional violation to be remediedP Second,
the decree would have the effect of restructuring governmental
units not implicated in RUD's or CHA's violations.9B The Supreme
Court considered and rejected both of these contentions seriatim.
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Court interpreted Milliken to hold
the metropolitan area-wide order in that case impermissible,
not because it envisioned relief against a wrongdoer extending beyond the city in which the violation had occurred
but because it contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the operation of local governmental entities that were
not implicated in any constitutional violation.90
The Court noted a critical distinction between HUD in Gautreaux
and the suburban school districts restructured by the Milliken
order. HUD had violated the Constitution whereas the suburban
school districts had not been implicated in any acts of de jure
segregation. loo Milliken, it stated, was not a per se rule proscribing remedial orders which extend beyond the geographic boundaries
of the city where the violation occurred.lOl
The Court believed that the more substantial issue before it
was whether a metropolitan remedial order would, as a matter of
law, require interference with the operations of local governments
not implicated in HUD's unconstitutional conduct.1°z In deciding
that such interference was not the inevitable result of a metropolitan order, the Court reasoned that a federal court possesses
the ability to formulate a remedial plan providing the constitutional relief warranted while simultaneously adhering to the limitations on judicial power established in Milliken.los The Court
observed that recent public housing legislation vested HUD with
the authority to contract directly with private owners and developers without an intermediary public housing agency.l04 There96 S. Ct. at 1546.
!d.
[d. at 1545.
[d. at 1546.
[d. at 1547. The Court stated that it was "entirely appropriate and consistent
with Milliken to order CHA and HUD to attempt to create housing alternatives
for those [plaintiffs] in the Chicago suburbs." [d. The Court observed that the entire metropolitan area was relevant for purposes of plaintiffs' housing options. [d.
102. [d.
103. [d. at 1548.
104. The Court is alluding to the new Section 8 program enacted by the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 1437£ (Supp. 1976).
See note 138 infra and accompanying text.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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fore, within the framework of existing legislation, HUD, by the
exercise of discretion in the selection of housing proposals and
through direct contractual arrangements with private owners, was
capable of providing relief to the members of the plaintiffs' class
without diminishing the role of the local governments in the federal
housing programs. 105
The Supreme Court noted the emphasis which Congress had
placed on locating housing so as to avoid undue concentrations of
lower-income persons and to promote diverse housing opportunities. lo6 "An order directed solely to HUD," the Court reasoned,
"would not force unwilling localities to apply for assistance under
these programs but would merely reenforce the regulations guiding
HUD's determination of which of the locally authorized projects
to assist with federal fundS."lo7 Projects would not be built without the localities' consent except as provided by statute, and land
use controls would remain in force. los Satisfied that the limitations
implied in its opinion would protect the suburban localities from
undue interference by the federal government, the Court affirmed
the decision of the Seventh Circuit, remanding the case for the
consideration of a metropolitan area-wide remedial plan. 109

105. From the phraseology used in this opinion it is apparent that the Supreme Court
envisioned something akin to a "best efforts" order rather than an order which
would impose upon HUD a specific unit production quota.
106. See 42 U.S.c. § 5301 (b) (Supp. 1976) :
The Congress further finds and declares that the future welfare of the
Nation and the well-being of its citizens depend on the establishment and
maintenance of viable urban communities as social, economic and political
entities . . . .
and id. § 5301 (c)(6) :
The primary objective of this chapter is the development of viable
urban communities, by providing decent housing and a suitable living environment and expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons
of low and moderate income. Consistent with this primary objective, the
Federal assistance provided in this chapter is for the support of community development activities which are directed toward the following
specific objectives- ...
The reduction of the isolation of income groups within communities
and geographical areas and the promotion of an increase in the diversity
and vitality of neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for persons of lower income and the revitalization of
deteriorating or deteriorated neighborhoods to attract persons of higher
incomes. . . .
107. 96 S. Ct. at 1549.
108. Stripped to its essentials, this opinion merely instructs HUD to use its preexisting statutory authority in a manner which will afford the plaintiffs the
greatest degree of relief. The opinion's vitality is derived, nonetheless, from its
recognition that the entire metropolitan area for the purposes of housing programs
and options is a single integrated unit.
109. 96 S. Ct. at 1550.
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Maryland Public Housing Law

The Maryland enabling statute creates in each city of the
'State a housing authority, but the authority's powers remain
.dormant until the governing body of the city passes a resolution
declaring a need for the authority to function in the city,11° Once
the resolution is passed and the authority begins operation, it pos,sesses the powers necessary to effectuate its purposes,111 those purposes being primarily the elimination of slum areas and the con;struction of sanitary dwelling accommodations for persons of low
income,112 As with the CHA in the Gautreaux decisions, a Maryland housing authority may operate in an area extending beyond
the city's boundaries,11a Before passage of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,114 Baltimore City's housing authority had never exercised the extraterritorial jurisdiction.ll5
Although state law grants it authority to operate in Baltimore
County, federal law requires the city to obtain a consent agreement
from the county,116 Despite solicitations by Baltimore City, the
·county has withheld its consent.1l7
Maryland law also provides that two or more housing authorities may join together in the construction and operation of a
housing project in the area of operation of one of the authorities. us
Baltimore City has been unable to establish a cooperating arrangement with any of the suburban areas,119 In terms of the metro-politan expansion of public housing opportunities, such a joint
-program is impossible in the absence of willing cooperation of the
:suburban areas.

110.
-111.
-112.
-113.
-114.

115.
-116.
117.

-118.
119.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 44A, § 4 (1957).
ld. § 8.
ld. § 2.
Compare ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 670, §§ 17(b), 27c (1959) (three mile extraterritorial jurisdiction), with MD. ANN. CODE art. 44A, § 3(f) (1957) (ten mile
extra-territorial jurisdiction' excluding other incorporated cities).
Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered
sections of 12, 15, 20, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C.).
See note 146 illira. See also Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 75, 83-84.
42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (1970). In Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitall Housing
Authority, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975),
the constitutionality of such a consent agreement was upheld.
Embry Interview, supra note 40. With respect to public housing, Baltimore
County and Baltimore City are adverse parties. The county, having attracted
middle and upper class whites from the city, has a tax rate which is approximately half that of the city. It also is able to spend substantially more per pupil
to educate its school children. Public housing tenants, of course, are tax consumers as opposed to tax payers and would dilute the county's tax base. In
1970, approximately seventy percent of the public housing tenants in Baltimore
City were welfare recipients. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 91.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 44A, § 11 (1957).
Embry Interview, supra note 40.
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The State has not contributed in any appreciable degree to the
solution of the lower-income housing problem which confronts the
Baltimore metropolitan area. 120 In a recent amendment to the
statute creating the housing authorities, the legislature proclaimed:
It is hereby found and declared that there exists within
Baltimore City a critical shortage of decent, safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations available either to rent or
purchase which persons of eligible low income can afford .
• • • 121

It is this type of myopia which inhibits metropolitan involvement

in public housing programs. While persons of low income presently
are confined primarily to the city, the shortage of affordable housing for persons of low income extends throughout the metropolitan
area. 122 As acknowledged in the Gautreaux decision, the housing
options for persons of low income should extend to the entire
metropolitan area.12S
IV.

THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
ACT OF 1974

The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974124 substantially altered existing public housing and community development legislation. As noted in Gautreaux, the flexibility of the
housing assistance programs spawned by the Act expanded the
role of HUD in providing lower-income housing opportunities.125
From the standpoint of metropolitan involvement in the lowerincome housing assistance programs, however, the most innovative
and far-reaching aspect of the 1974 Act is the connection established between the housing programs and the community development programs, namely, the housing assistance plan. 126
120. Ide See also Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9.
121. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 44A, § 8B(a) (Supp.1976).
122.
[T]he impact of the concentration of the poor and minorities in the central
city extends beyond the city boundaries to include the surrounding community. The city and suburbs together make up what I call the "real
city." To solve the problems of the "real city", only metropolitan-wide

123.
124.
125.
126.

solutions will do.
Gautreaux V. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930, 937 (7th Cir. 1975),.
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Hills V. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct 1538 (1976)
(statement by Secretary Romney).
96 S. Ct. at 1547.
Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered
sections of 12, IS, 20, 40, 42, 49 U.S.c.) [hereinafter cited as the 1974 Act].
96 S. Ct. at 1549.
See Hearings on Implementation of Section 8 and Other Housing Programs
Before the Subcommittee on Holtsing and Urban Development of the House
Committee on Banking, Currency and Housillg, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5·
(1975). See generally City of Hartford V. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn..
1976).
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Each local government making an application for a Community
Development Block Grant127 must include in its application a housing assistance plan which (1) accurately surveys the condition of
'existing housing in the community,128 (2) assesses the housing
assistance needs of lower-income persons residing or expected to
reside in the community,129 (3) specifies a realistic annual goal for
the number of families to be assisted, ISO and (4) indicates the
general location of proposed housing for lower-income persons. lSl
This application requirement cannot be waived by HUD.132 The
potential effect of this requirement from a metropolitan perspective
is that a suburban community will no longer receive funding for
community development projects while simultaneously abrogating
its responsibility for the provision of lower-income housing. 13s
In some metropolitan areas the link established between housing and community development programs may have a coercive
effect on suburban areas, requiring them to formulate realistic
lower-income housing plans to avoid loss of community development funding. 134 In Baltimore County, the threatened loss of com127. Ten existing community development programs administered by HUD were consolidated and replaced by the Community Development Block Grant Program.
See C.F.R. § 570 l(c) (1976).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (a) (4) (A) (Supp. V, 1975).
129. [d.
130. !d. § 5304(a)(4)(B).
131. [d. § 5304(a) (4) (C).
132. [d. § 5304(b) (3).
133. See S. REP. No. 93--693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
134. See, e.g., City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976), in which
the City of Hartford brought suit against HUD and seven suburban towns
challenging the propriety of HUD's decision to approve community development
block grant applications submitted by these towns. The gravamen of plaintiff's
complaint was that HUD had approved these grants without requiring the
suburban communities to submit realistic estimates of the number of lowerincome persons expected to reside within its borders. Six of the seven towns
had submitted estimates of zero and the seventh submitted an estimate derived
from a calculation formula admittedly unacceptable to HUD. Plaintiff argued
that the approval of these grants, despite submission of patently unrealistic
"expected to reside" estimates, was tantamount to a de facto waiver of this application requirement in contravention of the statute. The District Court found
that the "expected to reside" figure was "the keystone of the spatial deconcentration objective of the ••• 1974 Act", and held that the approval of these
deficient grant applications was an abuse of discretion by HUD. Accordingly,
the funding of these grants was enjoined.
The importance of the holding in this case is deflated when the basis of
the "expected to reside" estimate is examined. The "expected to reside" figures
are estimates of the number of lower-income persons expected to be employed
in the community as a result of expanding commercial development. 24 C.F.R.
§ 570, 303(C)(2)(i) (1976). But in a large city such as Baltimore, the strain
on the treasury and public housing programs is caused by welfare and other
non-working families. Therefore, even realistic "expected to reside" estimates
overlook the segment of the population most in need of public housing. Embry
Interview, supra note 40.
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munity development funding would not promote low-income housing programs since the county lacks any community development
programs. l35
The housing assistance plan relates to another aspect of the
1974 Act - Section Slower-income housing assistance programs. 13 6The new Section S programs attempt to establish a nexus between
the public and private markets by making use of the private housing market and developers in a public housing program through
three types of assisted housing: existing, substantially rehabilitated and new. Currently, only the existing program is being used
to provide housing for lower-income families. The programs for
substantially rehabilitated and new housing are devoted almost exclusively to housing for the elderly and handicapped. 137
The Section S existing housing program operates in accordance
with an annual contributions contract between HUD and the
PHA.138 Pursuant to this contract, the PHA makes assistance payments to participating owners of existing units who rent to lowerincome tenants. 139 Families wishing to participate in this program
must first be determined eligible by the PHA and obtain a Certificate of Family Participation. Ho Thereafter, a certified family is
responsible for searching the area of operation of the sponsoring
PHA and finding an existing privately-owned dwelling unit which
satisfies its needs. HI Once a suitable dwelling unit is found, if the
owner is willing to participate in the program, a housing assistance
contract is entered into by the dwelling unit owner and the PHA.142
The amount of the assistance payment received by the property
owner equals the difference between the family's contribution (a
fixed percentage of income) and the gross rent.143 In areas where
no PHA operates, or where an existing PHA lacks the capability
to implement the program, HUD possesses the authority to contract directly with the owners.144
Prior to the 1974 Act, HUD could not make funds available for
a housing program without the approval of the local government
of the jurisdiction in which it would be located.145 This remained
135. League, supra note 5, at VII-I. Baltimore County made an application for a
Community Development Block Grant in 1975 but was declared ineligible because
it lacked urban renewal authority. ld.
136. United States Housing Act of 1937, § 8, 42 U.S.c. § 1437(£) (Supp. V, 1975),
formerly ch. 896, § 8, 50 Stat. 888 (1937).
137. Embry Interview, supra note 40.
138. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.104 (1976).
139. ld. § 882.105.
140. ld. § 882.209.
141. ld. § 882.103.
142. ld. § 882, app. II.
143. ld. § 882.114.
144. 42 U.S.c. § 1437f(b) (1) (Supp. V, 1975).
145. 42 U.S.c. § 1415(7) (b) (1970).
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true even when state law provided extra-territorial jurisdiction to
the PHA sponsoring the program.146
Although the 1974 Act retained this requirement for conventional public housing,147 all Section 8 programs consisting of more
than twelve units are now subject to a new procedure embodied
in Section 213 of the 1974 Act. uS In accordance with this procedure, the local government may comment about or object to the
program which is to be located within its boundaries, but it lacks
any veto power. 149 The local government's basis for comment or
objection is limited to an inconsistency with an approved housing
assistance plan, if one is in force, and/or a lack of need for public
housing.150 In either case, HUD makes the final decision on whether
the inconsistency or need exists.l5l
One infirmity of the Section 8 program is its reliance upon
voluntary participation by private owners.152 The paucity of owners in Baltimore County willing to participate in the Section 8
program inhibits HCD's efforts to utilize its entire area of operation to spatially deconcentrate public housing. 153 Although perhaps
also motivated by race or economics, the property owner's desire
to avoid formal contract obligations with HCD constitutes a significant factor contributing to owner unwillingness to participate
in the program.154
In order to circumvent private owner unwillingness, HCD has
corresponded with HUD, recommending amendment to the Section 8
program to allow the PHA to make direct payments to the lowerincome families who lease from the owner.155 If this reform were
enacted, the lower-income tenant would appear before the landlord as any other member of the renting public. The inhibition
against directly contracting with the HCD would be dispelled since
146. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 75, 79-30 (testimony of Robert C. Embry,
Commissioner, Department of Housing and Community Development).
147. 42 U.S.c. § 1437c(e) (Supp. V, 1975). "Conventional public housing" means
the construction and operation of housing projects by the PHA.
148. ld. § 1439. Programs for twelve (12) or fewer units are exempt from the local
comment and objection procedures. ld.
149. ld. § 1439(a).
150. ld. § 1439(a) (1) (B), (d) (1) (C).
151. 24 C.F.R. § 882.205 (1976). If an inconsistency with the local housing assistance plan forms the basis of the local government's objection, the importance of
HUD's initial scrutiny of these plans is emphasized.
152. See Comment, The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 - Who
Shall Live in Public Housing?, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 320, 334 (1976).
153. Embry Interview, supra note 40.
154. ld. Presently, a Section 8 program is in force in Baltimore County by which a
private real estate firm under contract with the State of Maryland performs the
functions of a PHA. Still in its infancy, this program has already attracted an
applicant waiting list of over 3,000 persons. League, supra note 5, at I11-6
and III-7.
155. Embry Interview, supra note 40.
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it would not be involved, and any refusal to rent based on race
could be litigated in a civil rights suit.156
Another infirmity in the Section 8 program is the limitation
on the amount of rent payable per unit imposed by HUn's fair
market value determination.157 This also restricts HCn's efforts
to recruit participating owners in the county, since the average
rental of a two-bedroom apartment plus utilities well exceeds the
figure established by Hun.158
Even if the infirmities in the Section 8 program were corrected,
the housing needs of large low-income families would still not be
met due to the relative scarcity of Baltimore County apartment
units with more than three bedrooms. l59
V.

THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN
BALTIMORE

While the vestiges of past discrimination in the city remain,
segregation, as a policy of the housing authority, has long since
been abandoned,160 A comparison of the 1970 and 1976 tenant
composition statistics reveals some progress toward integrating
the public housing projects. l6l Additionally, Hcn has recently
opened a large low-rise public housing project located in a racially
mixed neighborhood in the city,162 With the inception of Section 8
housing assistance programs, Hcn's extra-territorial area of operation has become functional for the first time.
The provisions of the Section 8 program, however, impede its
implementation in Baltimore County. The fair market rent established by HUn for the metropolitan area ($201 per month for a
two-bedroom unit) restricts Hcn's operations in the county,l63
156. E.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.c. § 1982 (1970); The Civil Rights
Act of 1968, Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer

157.
158.
159.
160.

161.
162.
163.

Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), wherein the Court stated:
On its face, therefore, [42 U.S.c.] § 1982, appears to prohibit all discrimination against Negroes in the sale or rental of property - discrimination
by private owners as well as discrimination by public authorities.
Id. at 421 (emphasis in the original).
For the Baltimore metropolitan area, the fair market value has been set by HUD
at $201.00. 41 Fed. Reg. 13065 (1976).
Interview with Samuel I. Rosenberg, Section 8 Coordinator, Department of
Housing and Community Development, in Baltimore, Aug. 10, 1976.
League, supra note 5, at 111-7.
See E. Ash, The Baltimore Story (Dec. 9, 1955). However, the past acts of
discrimination are still sufficient to invoke judicial relief. See Banks v. Perk,
341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973).
Compare App. A with App. B.
The new project, named Hollander Ridge, consists of approximately 1,000 units
and is located in northeast Baltimore.
See Hearings on Housing Assistance Payments, Community Developmeat Block
GraMs and Section 312 Rehabilitation Loans Before the Subcommittee on Hous-
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The additional duties placed on private owners l64 tend to discourage
their participation in the program. 1611 Until supply exceeds demand
in the private market, creating a desire in the private owner to
participate, the Section 8 program in its present structure will
fail to entice owner participation.166 While Section 8 program
infirmities will continue to handicap the lower-income housing
program in the metropolitan area, the primary impediment is the
failure of Baltimore County to actively participate in the program. 16T
If the Gautreaux case is applicable to metropolitan Baltimore,
HUD must use its best efforts and discretion to expand the honsing
options of the city's poor. 16S Realistically, this means increasing
the supply of public housing in Baltimore County for persons of
lower income. This can be achieved by a HUD allocation of funds
for use by HCD in its extra-territorial area of operation in the
county,169 or by a HUD by-pass of the PHA through exercise of its
authority pursuant to Section 8 (b) (1) to deal directly with private
owners.17° Another alternative, not involving HUD, would be for
Baltimore County to create a PHA, thereby operating its own
public housing program.17l
An inherent problem in using either of the first two alternatives
is that the Section 8 existing program will not be sufficient due to
a lack of existing housing. 172 Therefore, new construction is required.11S New construction, however, is not exempt from land
use controls and hence is vulnerable. 174
In a case pending before the Supreme Court, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp" m

164.

165.
166.

167.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

173.
174.
175.

ing and Urban Development of the House Committee on Banking, Currency and
Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 29-30 (1975).
ld. These extra duties may range from extra-territorial services and budget
counselling to the provision of day care centers.
ld.
ld.
See Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified,473 F.2d 910
(6th Cir. 1973). "No matter how a housing authority may try, their aims and
goals cannot be met without the support and leadership of the administration
within the city it attempts to build public housing." !d. at 1179. See also note 31
supra and accompanying text.
96 S. Ct. at 1547-48.
ld. at 1548.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (b) (1) (Supp. V, 1975).
To date Baltimore County has not created a public housing authority.
Hearings on H.R. 11769 Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Development of the HOltse Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th
Cong., lst Sess. at 490-91 (1976) (letter from RCDto the Subcommittee).
ld.
Rills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1550 (1976). See MD. ANN. CODE art. 44A,
§ 14 (1957).
517 F2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1976).
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the use of zoning regulations to prohibit construction of multifamily lower-income housing in a suburban community is being
reviewed. In this case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the denial of a zoning change violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment due to its discriminatory
effect. The court ruled that the preservation of property values
and a zoning plan were not compelling state interests permitting
the denial of equal protection. In making its decision, the court
took judicial notice of the Chicago metropolitan area's history
of segregated housing. The questions presented in the petition for
certiorari are:
(1) Does failure to grant rezoning request for multiple
family housing for low and moderate income families in
midst of single-family area violate Fourteenth Amendment,
even though Village was admittedly maintaining integrity
of its zoning plan and protecting neighborhood property
values? (2) Does alleged discriminatory housing pattern
in Chicago metropolitan area impose upon suburban municipality affirmative duty to ignore its admittedly proper
zoning ordinance to permit construction of multi-family
low and moderate income housing?176

If the Supreme Court affirms the Seventh Circuit's decision, a
local government's ability to employ land use controls as a barrier
to public housing will be diminished. If the Seventh Circuit is
reversed, and land use controls are permitted to be used in this way,
Baltimore County could still effectively prevent the construction
of public housing. ThEm the only viable alternative by which public
housing could be erected outside the city boundaries would be
active county participation. 177
The Baltimore metropolitan area needs a "fair share" lowerincome housing plan which would distribute the responsibility for
the provision of lower-income housing throughout the metropolitan
area rather than concentrating it in the center city. A proposed
amendment to Section 213 (d) (1) of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, under consideration by the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development, specifically
authorizes HUD to make adjustments in the allocation of funds
as it deems necessary to assist in the implementation of "fair
share" and other cooperative metropolitan area-wide housing

-------

176. 441 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 25,1975).
177. A more drastic alternative would be to completely remove local control from
the public housing program and legislatively exempt public housing from local
land use controls. The constitutional issues involved with such a program are
beyond the scope of this note.
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plans. 178 HUD fully supports this amendmentYo Absent such a
plan, the city will continue to bear a grossly disproportionate burden in the production and maintenance of lower-income housing
for the area's indigent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Neither the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
nor the Gautreaux decision have had a substantial impact on the
housing opportunities of the lower-income blacks residing in Baltimore City. Indeed, it is questionable whether any legislation or
court decision is capable of reversing the trend which racially
divides the Baltimore metropolitan area. The thrust of Gautreaux
is toward a racially integrated metropolitan area. Baltimore
County almost completely surrounds the city, luring higher-income
families away from the city, depleting the city of its economic
vitality. Paraphrasing Justice Clark's remarks in the Seventh
Circuit's Gautreaux decision, the absence of low-income housing
opportunities in a suburban area such as Baltimore County evinces
"a callousness on the part of [county officials] towards the rights
of the black, underprivileged citizens of [Baltimore City] that is
beyond comprehension."18o
The new federal programs represent an attempt to tailor public
housing into a form acceptable to middle class communities. Gone
are the high-rise monuments to ghetto poverty of the 1940's which
contributed so much to the formulation of negative attitudes towards public housing programs. Lingering, however, are the negative attitudes. The public for the most part is unaware of the
"new look" in public housing.
Unless the Gautreaux decision ignites a new appraisal of metropolitan housing responsibilities, the future looms bleak. Justice
Marshall's closing prediction in his Milliken dissent sounds a solemn
warning:
Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy
task. Racial attitudes ingrained ... are not easily set aside .
. . . But just as the inconvenience of some cannot be allowed
to stand in the way of the rights of others, so public opposition, no matter how strident, cannot be permitted to
divest this Court from the enforcement of the constitutional principle at issue.... In the short run, it may seem to
178. Hearings on Oversight of Section 8 Housing Assistance Program Before the
Subcommittee on Housil~g and Urban Developmmt of the House Committee on
Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 55 (1975).
179. Id.
180. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1975).
Justice Oark of the United States Supreme Court, retired, was sitting by
designation.
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be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas
to be divided up each into two cities - one white, the
other black - but it is a course, I predict, our people will
ultimately regret. lSI
John Weld

ADDENDUM
Since the initial printing of this article, the United States
Supreme Court filed its opinion in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 4073 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1977), discussed in Section V supra, reversing the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court of appeals held that in the absence of compelling state interests, the Village's refusal to rezone violated the equal protection clause because
of its racially discriminatory effect. The Supreme Court, however,
reiterated that racially disproportionate impact alone is insufficient
to show a denial of equal protection. The Court reaffirmed that
the plaintiff must prove that the challenged action was motivated.
by a discriminatry purpose. The reversal in this case was predicated upon a finding that the plaintiffs had not sustained their
burden of proof.
The imposition of such a stringent standard of proof will insulate an increased number of exclusionary zoning regulations from
the reach of the fourteenth amendment. Suburban communities
which have historically and consistently zoned to exclude lowerincome families will be able to justify on nonracial grounds zoning
decisions which have a racially disproportionate impact. The net
result of the Court's decision is the perpetuation of racial isolation
of suburban communities.

181. 413 U.S. at 814-15.
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APPENDIX A
(1970)

Population
Total

Project

Census Tract
% NOllwhite

Population
White

Population
Nonwhite

Population
Total

Latrobe
McCulloh ---Poe _____
Douglass _
Perkins - - Gilmor ________
O'Donnell __
Somerset __
Cherry Hill_
Cherry Hill
Ext. 1___
Cherry Hill
Ext. 2______
Claremont _
Lafayette __
Flag House_
Lexington
Terrace __
Murphy Homes
Westport Ext.
Fairfield Brooklyn __
'Westport 1_
Oswego MalL
Lakeview
Lowers --

93.8
98.7
98.4
64.9
68.2
99.6
6.8
9.5
99.6

72
0
0
0
239
0
2483
0
0

1979
1027
700
974
1732
1562
669
1571
2662

2051
1027
700
974
1971
1562
3152
1571
2662

96.5%
100 %
100 0/0
100 %
87.9%
100 %
21.2%
100 %
100 %

99.6

0

3154

3154

100 %

99.6
19.5
98.5
65.5

0
949
0
52

1546
252
3442
1900

1546
1201
3442
1952

100 %
21.1%
100 %
97.3%

87.1
99.3
97.9
80.4
1.6
97.9
94.2

0
0
0
0
1529
0
0

2634
2883
1177
1112
129
772
241

2634
1177
1112
1658
772
241

100 %
100 %
100 %
100 %
7.8%
100 %
100 %

83.7

26

170

196

86.7%

5,350

32,288

37,638

Source:

2883

Planning Division, Research & Analysis Section, Department of Housing
and Community Development. (Percent calculations by the author.)
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(1976)

p,.oject

•

•
•
•
•
•

Population
White

Population
Nonwhite

Latrobe
McCulloh
McCulloh Ext. _______
Poe -----._-Douglass - - - - Perkins _ _ _ _ _
Gilmor
O'Donnell -----Somerset
Cherry HilL_ _ _ _ _
Cherry Hill Ext. 1_ _
Cherry Hill Ext. 2____
Claremont -----Claremont Ext. ____
Lafayette
Flag House______
Lexington
Murphy
Westport Ext._
Fairfield _ _ _ _ _ _
Brooklyn ____
Westport ------Broadway _ _ _ _ _
West Twenty______
Mt. Winans _______
Oswego
Lakeview _ _ _ _ _
Bel ParL_ _ _ _ _
Govans Manor_____
Somerset Ext. _______
Wyman House______
Rosedale _________
Other (Scattered) ____

33
9
5
4
5
98
3
2204
8
4
13
6
775
146
20
19
3
14
7
6
1317
0
61
95
0
0
9
35
177
5
113
0
156

1823
930
1266
611
902
1774
1371
792
1349
2399
2795
1363
330
35
3036
1733
2424
2617
1028
1025
275
657
888
383
731
211
178
299

6072

1861
939
1271
615
907
1872
1374
2996
1357
2403
2808
1369
1105
181
3056
1752
2427
2631
1035
1031
1592
657
949
478
731
211
187
334
249
317
202
461
6228

Total __

5,350

40,236

45,586

72
312
89
461

Population
Total

Population
Total
98.2%
99.0%
99.6%
99.3%
99.4%
94.8%
99.9%
26.4%
99.4%
99.8%
99.5%
99.6%
29.9%
19.3%
99.3%
98.9%
99.9%
99.5%
99.3%
99.4%
17.3%
100.0%
93.6%
80.1%
100.0%
100.0%
95.2%
89.5%
28.9%
98.4%
44.01%
100.0%
97.5%
88.3%

• Indicates public housing projects limited to the elderly and handicapped.
Source: Planning Division, Research & Analysis Section, Department of Housing
and Community Development. (Percent calculations by the author.)

